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Abstract
We investigate the concepts of past, present, and future that build
upon a modal distinction between a settled past and an open future.
The concepts are defined in terms of a pre-causal ordering that is
determined by the qualitative differences between alternative possible
histories. We look what an event’s past, present, and future look
like in the so-called Minkowskian Branching Structures, one in which
histories are isomorphic to Minkowski space-time.
1 Introduction: a conflict about tenses
There is an acute conflict between our intuitive notions of past, present, and
future, and what current physics has to say about time.1 To list the main
features of the former (aka manifest time), (i) it assumes a mind-independent
tripartite division of the world into past, present, and future. (ii) These three
regions are supposed to continuously change as future events turn into present
events, and then – into past events. (iii) There is a further difference with
respect to openness vs. settledness: the future is seen as open, in contrast to
the past that is viewed as settled, or closed. (Whether the present is settled
is a subject of a little controversy, with the majority view opting for its being
settled, like the past).2 Concerning the present, the manifest view of time
suggests that (iv) it is global (so any object existing before a given present
and living sufficiently long hits upon it), (v) it cannot be repeated, (vi) it
1This work is a distant cousin to my paper “Locus for “now” (2011). For their prompts
to revise or precisify my earlier position, I am grateful to the audiences of the Bonn
Workshop on Time, of the Conference of the Minkowski Institute in Albena, and of the
reading group in Philosophy Department of the UC San Diego. I have also benefited
considerably from the discussions with Joanna Luc, Jacek Wawer and Leszek Wron´ski as
well as from insightful comments of two anonymous reviewers for this journal. The support
of the National Science Centre research grant Opus 2016/23/B/HS1/00464 is gratefully
acknowledged.
2For a recent characterization of manifest time, see Callender (2017, Ch. 1) .
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is achronal, and (vii) no two presents overlap. Although the terms in which
we stated the manifest view are somewhat vague, they are precise enough to
contradict the positions informed by the current physics of space and time.
Starting with the papers of Rietdijk (1966) and Putnam (1967), there
have been arguments showing that relativistic space-times are inimical to
the manifest view.3 The ensuing debate, which involved Malament (1977),
Dieks (1988), Stein (1991), van Benthem (1991), Rakic´ (1997) and others,
led to the following result concerning Special Relativity (SR):
R The following set of premises is logically inconsistent:
(1) the relations used to define co-presence and co-presence itself are
invariant with respect to automorphisms of Minkowski space-time,
(2) co-presence is a transitive relation on Minkowski space-time,
(3) of two co-present events, one cannot lie within a forward/backward
light cone of the other, and
(4) co-presence is neither the identity nor the universal relation on
Minkowski space-time.
To emphasize, R is an iron-clad result of logic; thus any attempt (including
this one) to secure a non-trivial notion of present, that is, the acceptance of
(4), entails a violation of at least one of (1)–(3).
Given the above outlined conflict between the manifest image of time
and the position informed by current physics, where does the present project
lie? Following an intuition associating the future with contingency, we will
construct a spatiotemporally extended and frame-independent notion of the
present, and, consequently, similar notions of the past and future. That is,
out of the seven claims associated with the manifest image, our priority is to
save (i). To explain our use of “ present”, we take this notion to be relative
to events: to refer to the present, we fix our attention on a particular event
(typically, a salient event like an utterance) and ask what the present of this
event is. Our aim is to indicate a part of our world which is a locus for the
present (past, future) of an arbitrary event. In other words, we will define
the set of events co-present with a given one, as well as the set of future
(past) events for an event in question. In doing so, we leave open the matter
of the explication of the continuous flow of events, since it clearly lies beyond
the scope of the project at hand.
The approach is intended to be conciliatory: on the one hand, we invite
the reader to modify her notion of the past, present, and future; taking stock
of our construction in Section 7 furnishes a list of the modifications required.
On the other, we believe that neither special relativity nor general relativity
3For a present assessment of Putnam’s argument, cf. Dorato (2008).
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are our ultimate truths, so perhaps one day there will be a theory of space-
time amenable to an aspect underlying the future as here constructed, i.e.,
local indeterminism.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we belabor the intuition
linking future with contingency. As a further analysis of this intuition requires
a framework for discussing modalities and tenses, in Sections 3 and 4 we
sketch the best available framework of this sort, Belnap’s (1992) Branching
Space-Times (BST) and Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS’s). Section 5
then presents some facts about an event’s past, present, and future in MBS’s.
In Section 6 we exhibit the present, past, and future of events in some selected
MBS’s. Some conclusions are furnished in Section 7.
2 A future – openness link
2.1 Some historical remarks
There is a long tradition that associates the future with open possibilities,
the past with settled facts, and the present with a region of passage from
possibility to settledness. The view arguably had a proponent in Aristotle
(Cael I.12). In more recent times, the idea has been defended by Whitrow
(1961, pp. 295–296):
Strict causality would mean that the consequences pre-exist in
the premises. But, if the future history of the universe pre-exists
logically in the present, why it is not already in the present? If, for
the strict determinist, the future is merely “the hidden present”,
whence comes the illusion of temporal succession? The fact of
transition and ‘becoming’ compels us to recognize the existence
of an element of indeterminism and irreducible contingency in the
universe. The future is hidden from us—not in the present, but
in the future. Time is the mediator between the possible and the
actual.
Similar elaborations on this view can be found in Eddington (1949) and
(1953). More recently, this position underlies Ellis’s models (2006, pp. 1812–13)
of an evolving block universe:
4 The construction developed here is in some aspects similar to that of Mu¨ller’s (2006)
and to a model I gave at Logica 2002 (unpublished). Some ideas presented here are the
fruit of discussions I had with T. Mu¨ller in the last decade. I am grateful to him for
sharing his insights with me. It also seems to me that Fred Muller once held similar views
on loci for the past, present, and future , but I could not find a relevant publication.
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Things could have been different, but second by second, one
specific evolutionary history out of all the possibilities is chosen,
takes place, and gets cast in stone.
It is not our aim to offer an exegesis of the above pronouncements but it
is nevertheless clear that the above quotes link tenses to modalities by these
two theses:
1. The Future is genuinely open in the sense that there are several possible
ways that the world might develop;
2. As time passes, while some possibilities are getting actualized, the
others turn into mere might-have-beens.
In a nutshell, this view links the future to modally understood indeterminism,
where this qualification means that alternative evolutions of an indeterministic
system are not reducible to modally flat notions, like models of a theory, or
Humean laws of nature (for more on the distinction modal vs. non-modal
notions of indeterminism, see Placek and Belnap (2012)).
The doctrine that the objectivity of the distinction between the past, the
present, and the future requires modal indeterminism has been vigorously
opposed.5 But no friends or foes of the doctrine have belabored the underlying
association between future and contingency to a point of stating it with a
rigor that would make the association amenable to formal treatment and
then – to rigorous criticism. It is precisely this first task to which we now
turn.
2.2 Belaboring the future – openness link
There are two intuitions that seem relevant to constructing the past, present,
and future from modal notions: the settledness of the past intuition, and the
openness of the future intuition. To clarify them, we turn our attention
to how we speak about future events, and consider what explanations of
futurity in modal terms are acceptable. So we will investigate schematic
explanations of the form “event f belongs to the future of event e because
. . . ”. Once we find an acceptable explanation of this kind, we will turn it
into the truth-conditions for “f belongs to the future of e”, and research
the consequences of these truth-conditions in later sections. We will focus
on concrete token-level events, like the Summer Solstice in 2019, which do
not and (arguably) cannot repeat in a given course of events. Token-level
events can have a modal aspect as well, witnesses by phrases like “That event
5 See e.g., Gale’s (1963) attempt to rebut Whitrow’s and Eddington’s arguments.
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could have occurred earlier (in a a slightly different location / in a slightly
different way) than it actually occurred”. David Lewis (1986, 195nn) called
such events “non-fragile”, while Belnap (2005 called them “disjunctive”. A
distinctive feature of a non-fragile/disjunctive event is that although it cannot
be repeated in any given history (so it is a token-level event), it might have
different pasts, so it might belong to more than one history. In everyday
modal talk we arguably refer to non-fragile/disjunctive events.6
To investigate our intuitions, consider two concrete events that appear
to be good candidates for one being in the future of the other: the Summer
Solstice in 2019 (s) and a rainy sunrise on Nov 20, 2018 in Del Mar (r).
The first intuition sees the past as settled. That is, although before that
particular sunrise in Del Mar things could go differently (it might be rainy,
and it might be sunny, and it might be foggy, etc.), from the perspective
of a future event, like s, it is settled (fixed, inevitable) that there was this
rainy sunrise. The settledness of the past intuition suggests the following
schematic explanation SP:
SP Event s belongs to the future of event r because at event s it is settled
that r has happened.
The openness of the future intuition is more elusive; we begin tentatively
with this proposal:
A s belongs to the future of r because it is not settled at r that s will occur.
Our schematic explanation A seems wrong, however. Perhaps this is overly
optimistic, but I am inclined to think that no matter how the world evolves
from its conditions in Nov 2018, there is the 2019 solstice in each of its
possible evolutions. Answer A sound bad because in this case either the
explanans is false, or s does not lie in the future of r. Let us therefore try
another one:
B s belongs to the future of r because a way s will occur is not settled at r.
Although answer B does not look immediately incorrect if applied to Summer
Solstice 2019, it is still counter-intuitive. To see this, think of your grandfather’s
Swiss watch (mechanical, almost perfect, always wound); suppose it sits in
an isolating contraption, and ask yourselves if it is already settled how it will
6 To give a real-life example, in wrestling circles it was hotly debated in Winter 2019
whether Becky Lynch’s entrance could have been improved. No-one argued that Lynch’s
entrance was what it was, so it could not have been improved. An argument of this kind
would suggest that Lynch’s entrance is understood as a fragile event,
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signal tomorrow’s noon. My intuition would be that this is already settled,
no matter what its surroundings are. Like with answer A, in this case either
the explanans is false, or s does not lie in the future of r.
The moral is that we need to accommodate the surroundings of s, which
is what proposal C does. It commends itself as being sufficiently weak, while
still linking future to contingency.
C s belongs to the future of r because before s there is an event and some
aspect of it that is not settled at r.
In other words, for s to belong to the future of r, one need some, however
small, contingency, like Heads or Tails, to occur before s (but not necessarily
after r). On this proposal, a small but properly located contingency makes a
tomorrow’s event involving your grandfather’s watch belong to the future
of your reading these words, no matter how well is the watch isolated.
Somewhat jocularly, this answer seems to make you and me the creators
of the future: if in fear that a tomorrow’s process is not in our future, flip
a coin, do a Stern-Gerlach experiment, or the like. The joke, of course, is
that if the results of a coin toss or a Stern-Gerlach experiment as well as
our “decision” to perform them are predetermined, it is not in our power to
create the future. But if there is no such pre-determination, no action on our
side is needed to create the future, as it is already there.
Since the schematic explanations C and SP of futurity seem acceptable,
at least as far as modal explanations go, we thus turn them into truth-
conditions for the sentence “f is in the future of e”:
S f is in the future of e iff it is settled at f that e has happened, and there
is some event e′ weakly before f and a subject matter A such that at
e it is contingent that A obtains at the location of e′.
Here “weakly before” is understood as “before or identical to”. But “before”
in our use calls for further attention, as it relates particular events that are
not necessarily from the actual history. In contrast to Obama’s presidency
occurring before Trump’s (in our history), we will say that a particular coin
toss occurs before (6) each of its alternative possible outcomes: the toss is
before tails up and before heads up. We will read e 6 e′ in English as “e′ can
really happen after e”. The ordering is thus B-theoretic, but it has a modal
aspect. Note that incomparability by 6 of two events can indicate two things:
the events belong to one history but none can really happen after the other
(because they are space-like related), or there is no possible history to which
they belong. In the context of Special Relativity, the ordering is to extend
the Minkowski ordering 6M of <4, defined in Eq. 1, to modal contexts.
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Our plan is to make S precise and then define the future of e, for any
given event e. By grasping a concept of the future, a characterization of the
past and the present follows naturally. We will define events in the past of
event e as those events from which perspective e is in the future. Having had
the notions of “events in the past of e” and “events in the future of e”, we
will declare that event e′ is in the present of e iff e and e′ share a possible
history and e′ is neither in the past nor in the future of e. Note that on this
construal, an event’s past, present, and future are sets of events, that is, they
are event-like concepts. They are not location-like concepts; consequently, we
will not discuss in this framework what the present of a given spatiotemporal
location is.
To reflect on what resources are needed to analyze S, apart from particular
events, e, e′, and f related by the pre-causal relation 6, S invokes spatio-
temporal locations of events, a subject matter (which will be naturally rendered
as a formula of a specified language), modal notions of contingency and
settledness; further S relativizes correctness of a sentence to spatio-temporal
events. Thus, to analyze S we need a semantics for a language containing
tense operators (“it will be the case that”, “it was the case that”), modal
operators (“it is still possible that”, “it is already settled that”), and location
operators (“at location (x, t) it is so that”); furthermore, the evaluation
points in this semantics should include spatio-temporal events. In other
words, we need a rigorous indexical framework representing space-time and
local modalities. Moreover, to obtain traction with the space-times of physics,
some structures definable in that framework (histories) should be isomorphic
to Minkowski space-time, or space-times of General Relativity.
The news is that there is on a market a rigorous framework precisely of
this kind: Branching Space-Times (BST) of Belnap (1992); as it is axiomatic,
it gives us an extra control over our constructions.7 The rest of this paper is
thus somewhat automatic. We will translate schema S into a more regimented
language amenable to the BST analysis. We then look into BST models to
learn what object it is, the totality of events lying in the future of a specified
event. We will focus on relevant models of BST, Minkowskian Branching
Structures (MBS’s) in which possible histories are isomorphic to Minkowski
space-time. There we could discern particular regions for present, past, and
future, so we can relate these findings to the mentioned debate about tenses
and Special Relativity.
7 BST is a development of an earlier theory of branching time (BT) of A. N. Prior
(1967). BT theory in turn was suggested in S. Kripke’s letter to Prior (dated September
3, 1958, unpublished); later it was worked out in Thomason (1970).
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3 Models of BST
The basic insight of branching theorists, one which we owe to Arthur Prior,
is that sentences are evaluated as true or false in event-history pairs. This
can be seen as adding more structure to Tarski’s notion of a sentence being
true or false in a model. In a branching-style framework, a sentence is true
in a model at an event-history pair e/h – this notation is to indicate that
e ∈ h. In this spirit, we have the following:
e/h1 |= Will : H but e/h2 |6= Will : H,
where a sentence H = “this flipped coin is landing heads up”, e is the event
of tossing this particular coin, and h1, h2 are histories, each containing the
toss, with heads landing up in h1 and tails landing up in h2.
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A structure of BST, 〈W,6〉, is a non-empty partially ordered set of
possible point events ordered by a pre-causal relation, subject to some postulates.
(For the postulates, see Appendix). Histories in 〈W,6〉 are identified with
particular (upward directed) subsets of W , in accord with what might be
called “the later witness criterion”. Namely, if two events can occur before a
third event, then all the three are co-possible, i.e., they share a possible
history. A BST structure 〈W,6〉, with an interpretation I added, is a
semantic model 〈〈W,6〉, I〉 for a propositional language with tense operators
and modal operators. Interpretation I is a function I : Atoms 7→ P(W ),
where Atoms is the set of atomic formulas.9
It is understood that atomic formulas of this language have the form:
“Here-and-now there is propertyX”. Turning to truth-conditions that recursively
define truth at a point of evaluation, we list a few examples. (To avoid lengthy
notation, we abbreviate the point of evaluation 〈〈〈W,6〉, I〉, e/h〉 to e/h. For
more information on BST semantical models, cf. Belnap (2007)).
e/h |= A iff e ∈ I(A) for A an atomic formula;
e/h |= ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that e/h |= ϕ;
e/h |= Will : ϕ iff there is e′ > e s.t. e′/h |= ϕ;
e/h |= Was : ϕ iff there is e′ < e s.t. e′/h |= ϕ;
e/h |= Poss : ϕ iff there is history h′ s.t. e ∈ h′ and e/h′ |= ϕ;
e/h |= Sett : ϕ iff for every history h′, if e ∈ h′ then e/h′ |= ϕ.
Note that in the last two clauses, since we quantify over histories on their
right-hand sides, the reference to history on the left-hand sides is redundant.
8 Note another feature: the language is indexical and tensed.
9A more general option is to take an interpretation to assign sets of pairs 〈e, h〉 (where
e ∈ h) to atomic formulas, but we use here a simpler option. For a discussion of this
matter, see Belnap and Mu¨ller (2014).
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We will thus write e |= Poss : A and e |= Sett : A instead of e/h |= Poss : A
and e/h |= Sett : A, resp.
Some (but not all) BST structures admit a further feature: space-time
locations (st-locations for short). A set Loc of st-locations for BST model
〈W,6〉 is a partition of W that is conservative with respect to ordering 6—
cf. Mu¨ller (2005). St-location is a relativistic counterpart of our everyday
thinking of what would happen at the time and in the spatial location of
a given event, if things went differently at some junction in the past. Note
that we have thus arrived at the distinction between event (i.e., an element
of W ) and st-location of an event (an element of a particular partition Loc
of W ). To denote the st-location of event e, we will write loc(e).
In what follows, we need to consider sentences of the form “At st-location
x it is ϕ”, like “The value of electromagnetic field at x is such-and-such.”
The truth conditions for such sentences can only be formulated with respect
to a BST model with set Loc of st-locations:10
e/h |= Atx : ϕ iff ∃e′ : e′ ∈ h ∩ x ∧ e′/h |= ϕ, where x ∈ Loc.
To comment on the evaluation in BST, sentences are always evaluated in
pairs e/h. If the sentence’s main operator is a tense operator, we keep h
fixed, and search for e′ on h s.t. at e′/h the sub-formula is true. If the main
operator is a modal operator, we keep e fixed and quantify over histories
passing through e. And, if the main operator is Atx, we keep h fixed and
locate a unique element e′ of the intersection x∩h; we evaluate then the sub-
formula at e′/h. (By the construction of Loc, any x ∈ Loc and any history
h intersect at a single event).
We are now able to formulate schema S within a language amenable to
BST analysis:
Definition 1 (future) An event f belongs to the future of event e, f ∈
Future(e), iff there is event e′ and an atomic formula A such that
1. e′ 6 f and
2. e |= Poss : Atloc(e′) : A and
3. e |= Poss : Atloc(e′) : ¬A, and
10 If all histories in a BST model share the same structure of locations (which is the case
for MBS’s we consider next) there is no obstacle to define tense operators in terms Atx
operators and the ordering of locations. We nevertheless follow here the usual exposition
of BST because in Conclusions we point to an odd contrast between tense operators and
metaphysical tenses investigated in this paper.
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4. for every history h, if f ∈ h, then e ∈ h.
To explain, the first clause requires that a witness e′ for f belonging to
the future of e occur weakly before f . The meaning of clauses (2) and
(3) is that from the perspective of e, it is contingent whether A is true at
location of the witness e′. The last clause encapsulates SP. Note that we
restrict our attention to atomic formulas: other formulas might have traces
of futurity/pastness or modalities which jeopardize this definition.
We end this section with the definition of the past of e and the present
of e, both phrased in terms of Future(e′), for some e′ ∈ W :
Definition 2 (past and present) Event e′ belongs to the past of event e,
e′ ∈ Past(e), iff e ∈ Future(e′).
Event e′ belongs to the present of event e, e′ ∈ Present(e), iff e′ 6∈ Past(e),
e′ 6∈ Future(e), and there is a history h such that e, e′ ∈ h.
Note that clause (4) of Definition 1 implies that if e ∈ Future(e′), then e, e′
share some history. Similarly, if e ∈ Past(e′), then e, e′ share some history.
For the definition of Present(e′), the requirement of sharing a history has to
be added separately. Apart from this addition, the definition characterizes
the Present purely negatively, as neither Past nor Future. Although (we
think) this is a hardly a contestable characterization, one might ask for more.
After all, human agents seem to be directly apprehending their nows, so a
positive description of distinctive features of the nows should be possible.
Yet we are skeptical: it looks as if our direct contact with our presents has
made us blind to their descriptive features. So we rest satisfied with the
negative definition given above.
4 Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS)
Although the above definitions adequately (we believe) capture our informal
statement of S, they do not permit us to “see” what the future, and hence
the past and the present, of an event are. This is a consequence of the
generality of BST, which leaves it open what BST histories exactly are, as
long as they are maximal upward directed subsets of a base set. Thus, to
address the “see” question, we need to make it relative to a specific concept
of space-time, and then consider such BST models, in which histories are
isomorphic to the space-time in question. We will investigate the problem
for Minkowski space-time.
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We will now turn to Minkowskian Branching Structures, i.e., BST structures
in which every history is isomorphic to Minkowski space-time.11 To begin
informally, a possible Minkowskian world can be thought of as Minkowski
space-time plus physical content. The content can be represented by the
attribution of “point properties” (typically, strengths of physical fields), i.e.,
a function from <4 to P(P ), where P is the set of point properties. To arrive
at a modal aspect, as exemplified for instance in saying “It is ϕ at x ∈ <4, but
it could be ψ there”, we need a system of such physical contents. A system
of this sort is represented by a property attribution F : <4 × Σ → P(P ),
where Σ is the set of labels for scenarios.
Since we haven’t (yet) imposed any restrictions on property attributions,
we should expect that they sometimes produce strange patterns of properties.
In an attempt to arrive at BST structures, we thus single out the class of
“proper” property attributions.
We shall put our requirement informally first: for F to be a proper
property attribution, we require that every two scenarios σ, η ∈ Σ are qualitatively
different somewhere and if they are different at some point, there is a special
point c ∈ <4 below this point (c is called splitting point for σ and η). Its
special character consists in that (1) σ and η agree at and below c, and that
(2) for a point x above c, no matter how close x is to c, there is always
an even closer point above c at which σ and η disagree in content.12 Note
that while postulating a complete qualitative agreement at and below c, we
do not require a complete disagreement above c; we readily permit that over
large regions above c the scenarios are qualitatively the same– as long as they
are different at locations arbitrarily close to c and above c. The locutions
“above” and “below” refer here to the so-called Minkowskian ordering 6M
of <4:
x 6M y iff
3∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2 ≤ (x0 − y0)2 and x0 ≤ y0, (1)
with a resulting strict ordering <M defined in a usual way (above ≤ denotes
the standard ordering of reals). The relation of being space-like related
(henceforth, SLR) is also typically defined: two points are SLR iff they are
incomparable by 6M . Putting the above explanation in symbols, we have
the following:
11MBS’s have been investigated by Mu¨ller (2002), Wron´ski and Placek (2009), and
Placek and Belnap (2012).
12 The background of the requirement is the density of a BST ordering, which is a BST
postulate.
11
Definition 3 A property attribution F : <4 × Σ → P(P ) is proper iff for
every σ, η ∈ Σ (σ 6= η) there is x ∈ <4 such that
F (x, σ) 6= F (x, η), and (2)
(for every x ∈ <4) if F (x, σ) 6= F (x, η), then there is c ∈ <4 such that c <M x
and
∀z ∈ <4(z 6M c→ F (z, σ) = F (z, η)) and (3)
∀x′ ∈ <4(c <M x′ → ∃y ∈ <4(c <M y <M x′ ∧ F (y, σ) 6= F (y, η))). (4)
All the points of <4 that satisfy conditions 3–4 constitute what we call the
set Sση of splitting points for σ and η. The meaning of Eq. 4 is that within
any maximal chain in <4 passing through a splitting point c, there is a
sequence of points above c and convergent to c, every element of which
has differing property attributions in σ and in η. From the definition of
proper property attribution one can deduce some desired properties of sets
of splitting points.13
To state them, it is useful to distinguish special subsets of <4, thought of
as regions of no qualitative difference of histories, and defined as14
Rση := {x ∈ <4 | ¬∃c (c <M x ∧ c ∈ Sση)} for σ, η ∈ Σ. (5)
Fact 4 Assume that F : <4 × Σ → P(P ) is a proper property attribution.
Then:
1. σ 6= η → Sση 6= ∅;
2. Sση = Sησ;
3. ∀c, c′ ∈ Sση (c 6= c′ → c SLR c′);
4. x ∈ Rση → F (x, σ) = F (x, η); and
5. ∀σ, η, γ ∈ Σ Rση ∩Rηγ ⊆ Rσγ.
13 We follow here the construction of Placek and Belnap (2012), which is more “physical”
than the others, since it derives BST structures from property attributions. Apart from the
proper property attributions, these authors assume a topological postulate and a condition
on chains of splitting points.
14 These are not maximal regions of qualitative similarity, as some regions above a
splitting point can be similar as well.
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Clearly, Σ is not the set of BST histories, and 6M is not a BST ordering –
they do not satisfy the BST postulates. (But there is a perfect match between
the two orderings if an MBS contains one history only – see Eq. 7). To
produce a BST structure, we need to construct these latter notions, showing
that they satisfy BST postulates. In this task, we follow Mu¨ller’s (2002)
construction, to which the reader should turn to for more information. First,
we define relation ≡ on <4 × Σ:15
xσ≡yη iff x=y and x ∈Rση. (6)
Provably ≡ is an equivalence relation on <4×Σ. Next, we define a BST event
as an equivalence class with respect to ≡, that is
{yη | yη ≡ xσ} := [xσ]
A BST ordering is defined as follows:
[xσ] 6 [yη] iff [xσ] = [xη] ∧ x 6M y. (7)
Importantly, it turns out that Σ is indeed a set of labels for histories, as
every BST history is of the form: hσ = {[xσ] | x ∈ <4} for σ ∈ Σ. It follows
that the MBS ordering 6, if restricted to a single history, coincides with the
Minkowski ordering 6M , as we clearly have:
[xσ] 6 [yσ] iff x 6M y. (8)
Moreover, given that a property attribution is proper and an additional
postulate is satisfied,16 [xσ] is a maximal element in the overlap of two
histories hσ and hη iff x is a splitting point for these histories, i.e., x ∈ Sση.
The construction should finish with proofs that the resulting structure is
indeed a BST model.17
Having done all this dry and formal work, we will now avail ourselves of
a picture as an interlude. Figure 1 illustrates two Minkowskian Branching
Structures, the first with two histories and one splitting point, and the second
—with four histories and two splitting points. The shaded area indicates
where a given history overlaps with the first history.
Formally speaking, an MBS is a triple 〈Σ, P, F 〉, where Σ is a set of
labels for scenarios, P is a set of point properties, and F is a proper property
15 To avoid eyestrain, we write xσ rather than 〈x, σ〉.
16 The postulate is: every convergent sequence in a set Sση is convergent to an element
of Sση—cf. Placek and Belnap (2012).
17 For proofs we refer the reader to Placek and Belnap (2012), or Mu¨ller (2002) and
Wron´ski and Placek (2009).
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Figure 1: Top: an MBS with one splitting point and two histories. Bottom:
an MBS with two splitting points and four histories. Shadowed regions
indicate the intersection of a given history with a reference history σ. In
contrast to this diagram, BST axioms do not dictate that such two splitting
points require four histories.
attribution. A merit of this construction is that 〈Σ, P, F 〉 provides a natural
semantic model for a propositional language with tense operators and modal
operators, and whose atomic sentences have the form:
It is ψ here-and-now,
where ψ ∈ P . Furthermore, the proper property attribution F determines
interpretation function I in the following manner:
[xσ] ∈ I(A) iff ψ ∈ F (x, σ), where A =“It is ψ here-and-now”.
The BST truth conditions for tense and modal operators can be readily
reformulated in the MBS framework. For a point of evaluation we take
〈〈Σ, P, F 〉, [xσ]/σ〉, which we abbreviate as [xσ]/σ. Location loc([xσ]) = x,
of course. As an example, we give below the truth conditions for Poss and
Aty (y ∈ <4):
[xσ]/σ|=Poss :B iff there is η∈Σ such that [xσ]=[xη] and [xη]/η |=B
[xσ]/σ |= AtyB iff [yσ]/σ |= B, where y ∈ <4.
(9)
Since in the clause for Poss the reference to label σ after the stroke is
redundant, we will write [xσ] |= Poss : B for [xσ]/σ |= Poss : B.
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With this whole machinery in place, we will now translate Definition 1 into
the language of MBS’s and then prove some properties of the past, present,
and future in this framework. Below we write Hxσ for the set of labels for
those histories to which [xσ] belongs, i.e., Hxσ := {η ∈ Σ | [xσ] = [xη]}.
Definition 5 (future, MBS-style) An event f = [xσ] belongs to the future
of event e = [yη], [xσ] ∈ Future([yη]), iff there is event e′ = [zσ′] and an
atomic formula A such that
1. [zσ′] < [xσ] and
2. [yη] |= Poss : Atz : A and
3. [yη] |= Poss : Atz : ¬A, and
4. Hxσ ⊆ Hyη.
The past and the present of a given event are defined analogously as in Def. 2.
5 Past, present and future: results
In this section we will prove a few facts about past, present, and future in
MBS’s and discuss their features.
Modality first! We observe that the past, present, and future of a given
event are fully characterized by simple facts about the inclusion of possible
histories. This means that the three notions are characterized in modal terms
only.
Fact 6 1. [xσ] ∈ Future([yη]) iff Hxσ ( Hyη;
2. [xσ] ∈ Past([yη]) iff Hyη ( Hxσ;
3. [xσ] ∈ Present([yη]) iff there is γ ∈ Σ such that [xσ] = [xγ] and [yη] =
[yγ] and (i) Hyγ = Hxγ or (ii) Hyγ \Hxγ 6= ∅ and Hxγ \Hyγ 6= ∅;
4. Future([yη]) is closed upward, i.e., if [xσ] ∈ Future([yη]) and [xσ] ≤
[x′σ′], then [x′σ′] ∈ Future([yη]);
5. Past([yη]) is closed downward, i.e., if [xσ] ∈ Past([yη]) and [x′σ′] ≤
[xσ], then [x′σ′] ∈Past([yη]).
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Proof: (1)⇒. (?) Hxσ ⊆ Hyη is just clause (4) of Def. 5. To prove the strict
inclusion, we will find ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Hyη such that {ρ1, ρ2} 6⊆ Hxσ. Let [xσ] ∈
Future([yη]). By clause (1) of the same Def. 5, there is a witness [zσ′] 6 [xσ],
which implies z 6M x and [zσ′] = [zσ]. Clause (2) and (3) of this Definition
then imply, by the truth-conditions (9), that there are ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Σ and atomic
formula A s.t. (†) [zρ1]= A and [zρ2]= ¬A, and [yη] = [yρ1] = [yρ2], so (‡)
ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Hyη. Observe next that (†) means that F (zρ1) 6= F (zρ2). Def. 3
then requires the existence of a particularly located splitting point, c ∈ Sρ1ρ2
s.t. c <M z, so c <M x (since [zσ] 6 [xσ]). Hence x 6∈ Rρ1ρ2 . Thus, by
Eqs. 5 and 6, [xρ1] 6= [xρ2], so it is impossible that both [xσ] = [xρ1] and
[xσ] = [xρ2]. Hence {ρ1, ρ2} 6⊆ Hxσ. This implies, taken together with (‡)
and (?), the strict inclusion Hxσ ( Hyη.
(1) ⇐. RHS implies that there is γ ∈ Σ s.t. [xσ] 6= [xγ] but [yη] = [yγ] =
[yσ]. By Eqs. 5 and 6, there is c ∈ Sσγ s.t. c <M x. Thus, by clause (4) of
Def. 3, there is z, with (†) c <M z <M x, such that F (zσ) 6= F (zγ), hence for
some atomic A, [zσ] |= A and [zγ] |= ¬A (or vice versa). Since σ, γ ∈ Hyη,
we get [yη] |= Poss : Atz : A and [yη] |= Poss : Atz : ¬A, so clauses (2) and
(3) of Def. 5 are satisfied. Clause (4) follows from RHS, and clause (1) is
implied by (†).
(2) Immediate from (1).
(3) From (1) and (2) above, and by the requirement that [xσ] and [yη] share
a history.
(4) Immediate from (1).
(5) Immediate from (2). 
Openness is great again. The construction has a desired consequence
concerning openness vs. settledness. If Future([yη]) 6= ∅, then it is open in
the sense that there is no single history that contains it wholly. In contrast,
for any [yη], Past([yη]) is settled in the sense that it is a subset of a history
(typically, of more than one history). Finally, settledness of Present([yη])
is more tricky, as it depends on the details of the model. These claims are
stated more precisely and then proven in the facts below.
Fact 7 (1) If Future([yη]) 6= ∅, then there are [xσ], [xσ′] ∈ Future([yη]) such
that [xσ] 6= [xσ′].
(2) For every [xσ] ∈Past([yη]): [xσ] = [xη].
Proof: (1) Let Future([yη]) 6= ∅. By Fact 6(4) and since histories are upward
directed, there is [xσ] ∈ Future([yη]) s.t. y <M x. By clause (1) – (3) of
Def. 5 there are witnesses σ′ ∈ Σ, σ 6= σ′, z ∈ <4, z <M x, and atomic
formula A such that (†) [zσ] |= A and [zσ′] |= ¬A and [yη] = [yσ] = [yσ′].
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Since y <M x, Hxσ′ ⊆ Hyσ′ , and since [yσ′] = [yη], clause (4), i.e., Hxσ′ ⊆ Hyη
follows. Thus, we got [xσ′] ∈ Future([yη]). By (†), there is c ∈ Sσ,σ′ such
that c <M z and hence c <M x. It follows that [xσ] 6= [xσ′].
(2) Clearly, the implication holds if Past([yη]) = ∅. Otherwise, by Fact 6 (2)
for any [xσ] ∈ Past([yη]), η ∈ Hxσ, and hence [xσ] = [xη]. 
To comment on the proof of clause (1), note that a region of the Future
of e that is above e is always open; yet there might be other regions of the
Future of e, and they may fail to be open. We turn to the Present next:
Fact 8 There are MBS’s in which (1) events have open Presents and (2) the
relation of being co-present with a given event is not transitive.
Proof: (1) A sought-for MBS is depicted at the bottom of Figure 1. It
has two space-like related binary splitting points c and c′ and four histories,
labelled by σ, η, τ , and γ. The splittings are given by c ∈ Sστ ∩Sσγ∩Sητ ∩Sηγ
and c′ ∈ Sση ∩ Sσγ ∩ Sτη ∩ Sτγ. Pick x, y ∈ <2 such that x > c but x 6> c′
and y 6> c but y > c′. Consider then [xσ], [xτ ] and [yτ ]. By the splittings
we have (†) Hxσ = {σ, η}, Hxτ = {τ, γ}, and Hyτ = Hyσ = {σ, τ}. So [xσ]
and [yτ ] share a history (σ) and [xτ ] and [yτ ] share a history (τ).18 Also,
Hxσ \Hyσ 6= ∅, Hyσ \Hxσ 6= ∅, Hxτ \Hyτ 6= ∅, and Hyτ \Hxτ 6= ∅. It follows
that [xσ], [xτ ] ∈ Present([yτ ]). On the other hand, x > c ∈ Sστ implies
[xσ] 6= [xτ ], which proves that Present([yτ ]) is open.
(2) The same MBS is a witness for the second claim. The co-presence is
defined by: CP (e, e′) iff e ∈ Present(e′). By Fact 6 (3), CP is reflexive and
symmetric. So we have CP ([xσ], [yτ ]) and CP ([yτ ], [xτ ]). But by (†) above,
[xσ] and [xτ ] do not share a history, so they are not co-present. 
Note that our witness for the openness of future and non-transitivity of
co-presence is based on a pair of SLR splitting points, with the splitting
working “combinatorially”. That is, two outcomes split at each splitting
points, and then we have four histories. It takes little reflection to see that
this pattern of splitting always leads to the openness of future and non-
transitivity of co-presence. A remedy is to postulate that splitting does not
happen combinatorially. We return to this subject on p. 18
Is the tripartite division observed? The way we defined the three
notions, Past, Present, and Future of event [yη], they divide any history
to which [yη] belongs. That is, for any history hσ = {[xσ] | x ∈ <4}, σ ∈ Σ,
and such that [yη] = [yσ] ∈ hσ,
hσ = (Past([yη]) ∪ Present([yη]) ∪ Future([yη])) ∩ hσ. (10)
18 For brevity’s sake, we write “in history σ”, though to be correct, it should be “in
the history labelled by σ”.
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Since Future([yη]), if non-empty, is not fully contained in any history (and
Present([yη]) might happen not to be fully contained in any history), we
need to have an intersection with hσ on the RHS of the above equation.
Note however that in some cases the division might be into fewer sets than
three, since Future, or Past, or both might be empty (see Section 6). On
the other hand, Present([yη]) 6= ∅ for every [yη], since [yη] ∈ Present([yη]),
see Fact 6 (3). Thus, the tripartite division can be degenerate, but it holds
(degenerate or not). Another weirdness is that Past and Future of a given
event can overlap – see Section 6.
Invariance The Past, Present, and Future of a given event are defined in
terms of pre-causal ordering 6 and set-theoretical operations on it. This
ordering, if restricted to a single history, yields the Minkowski ordering
6M , see Equation 8, which is invariant with respect to automorphisms of
Minkowski space-time. Thus, the regions of histories that our definitions
pick out are invariant with respect to these automorphisms.
Transitivity of co-presence – modal correlations to the rescue?
Clearly, co-presence is reflexive and symmetric (each by Fact 6 (3)). However,
it may fail to be transitive, which we showed in Fact 8. The proof was
based on disjunct (ii) of Fact 6 (3), which requires non-empty differences
of the sets of appropriate labels. Observe, however, that if co-presence is
based on identity of sets of labels (which is disjunct (i) of the same Fact),
transitivity obtains since obviously identity is transitive. This brings in the
question: under what condition the nice disjunct (i) Hxσ = Hyσ rather than
the troublesome disjunct (ii) of Fact 6 (3) obtains?
To unpack (i), it means that for every γ ∈ Σ, x ∈ Rσγ iff y ∈ Rσγ (here
we already incorporated the condition that [xσ] and [yη] share a history, σ).
This is further equivalent to the claim that for any γ, ∃c ∈ Sσγ c <M x iff
∃c′ ∈ Sσγ c′ <M y. This condition is trivially satisfied if histories split from
σ in the common past of x and y rather than in the past of one of them
only. It has a bite if σ splits from histories γ and η at two space-like related
points c ∈ Sσγ and c′ ∈ Sση only, where c <M x but c 6<M y, and c′ <M y
but c′ 6<M x. Then the condition requires that exactly the same histories
must split at c and c′. Thus, c ∈ Sση and c′ ∈ Sσγ as well. This coordinated
splitting is in contrast to the MBS with “combinatorial” splitting depicted
at the bottom of Figure 1, where, for instance, σ and τ split at c, but not at
c′.
Somewhat worryingly, such coordinated splittings are reminiscent of EPR
correlations, modally understood. On this understanding, although each of
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the two space-like related measurements has two possible outcomes, say +
and −, some joint combinations of these outcomes, say ++, or −−, are not
possible.19 Such modal correlations, known also as “modal funny business”,
MFB, have been analyzed in BST literature, in particular in the context
of quantum experiments, cf. Belnap (2002, 2003), Mu¨ller et al (2008), and
references therein.
Since in the condition above the quantification is over all histories γ, in
order to enforce the transitivity of co-presence in the whole MBS, one needs
to assume the following global condition:
Definition 9 (MFB) For every σ, γ, η ∈ Σ and every c, c′ ∈ <4:
if c ∈ Sσγ, c′ ∈ Sση and c SLR c′, then c′ ∈ Sσγ.
We prove now that the condition of MFB does some useful work:
Fact 10 For any event [yη] in an MBS that satisfies MFB, (1) Present([yη])
is settled and (2) co-presence is transitive.
Proof: (1) From the assumption that there are distinct events [xσ], [xσ′] ∈
Present([yη]) we derive a contradiction with MFB. By Fact 6 (3), there
are γ, γ′ ∈ Σ such that [xσ] = [xγ], [xσ′] = [xγ′], [xγ] 6= [xγ′], and (†)
[yη] = [yγ] = [yγ′]. Hence x 6∈ Rγγ′ but y ∈ Rγγ′ . There is thus c ∈ Sγγ′
such that c <M x but c 6<M y. Further, since γ′ ∈ Hyγ but γ′ 6∈ Hxγ,
Hyγ 6= Hxγ. Thus, condition (i) of Fact 6 (3) is not satisfied, so condition
(ii) must hold, so in particular we must have Hxγ \Hyγ 6= ∅. Thus, for some
α ∈ Σ: [yα] 6= [yγ] but [xα] = [xγ]. There is thus c′ ∈ Sαγ such that c′ <M y
but c′ 6<M x. It cannot be that c and c′ are comparable, as it implies c′ <M x
or c <M y. Hence c SLR c
′. As the premises of MFB are satisfied, it follows
that c′ ∈ Sγγ′ . Since c′ <M y, we get that [yγ] 6= [yγ′], which contradicts (†).
We thus derived a contradiction from the assumption that Present([yη]) is
open, which proves that it is settled.
(2) Recall that co-presence is symmetric. Let us thus suppose that (†) [xσ],
[x′σ′] ∈ Present([yη]). We argue that [x′σ′] ∈ Present([xσ]). As we just
proved, Present is settled, so there is α ∈ Σ such that (‡) [xσ] = [xα],
[x′σ′] = [x′α], and [yη] = [yα]. By the argument like in the proof above,
given MFB, condition (ii) of Fact 6 (3) cannot be satisfied. That is, it is
not true that (Hxα \ Hyα 6= ∅ and Hyα \ Hxα 6= ∅), and it is not true that
(Hx′α \ Hyα 6= ∅ and Hyα \ Hx′α 6= ∅). Thus, since (†) holds, condition (i)
of Fact 6 (3) must be satisfied, i.e., Hxα = Hyα and Hx′α = Hyα. Thus,
Hx′α = Hxα. This together with (‡) shows that [xσ′] ∈ Present([xσ]). 
19 Observe that missing joint outcomes need not be understood in modal terms, as
the impossibility of certain histories. A more standard move, as suggested by quantum
mechanics, is to assign zero probability to such (seemingly) impossible results.
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Separation of past, present, and future from causal cones. By our
Definition 5, it may transpire that the Future of event e is larger than the
future light cone of e. Similarly, Past of event e may happen to be larger that
the past light cone of e. These results reflect the absence of a causal-order
condition in our explication of Future, i.e., we do not require that e < f
for f being in the future of e. This is because we want Past, Present, and
Future to be defined in terms of modal notions only, which is indeed achieved
(see Fact 6). Also, we want to have a possibly thin Present, which calls for
making Past and Future possibly large.
A more general observation is that tenses work differently than the pre-
causal ordering 6. It might happen that an event belongs to the Present
of a given event, although it is pre-causally before (or after) it. This has
further counter-intuitive consequences. For instance, consider three pre-
causally related events e < e′ < e′′ such that in the history to which they
all belong there is just one choice point c, which is located between e and e′.
Our framework then gives the verdict that e′ and e′′ belong to the Future of
e, but e′′ belongs to the Present of e′ rather than to the Future of e′.20 As we
may make the temporal distance (in terms of metric time) between e′ and e′′
arbitrarily large, the worry is that e′′ “comes to being well before its time”.
One may try to alleviate this worry by interpreting the succession of causally
extended presents as a granular way of becoming. On this reading, the fact
that two temporally remote events are co-present means that they come to
being at the same stage of becoming. Having said so, I concede that the
separation of tenses from causal and temporal relations is counter-intuitive.
To make things worse, not every model allows for the succession of presents
– see above on the transitivity of co-presence.
What is it really like? Since the Past, Present and Future of events
depends heavily on where, and how often, alternative histories split, a premonition
of whether, and if so, how splitting happens in our world is highly interesting.
As this is a large topic, two remarks must suffice here. On a standard
understanding of radioactivity, a radioactive particle existing without decay
for a time being makes for a continuous set of splitting points. The existence
of modal correlations, EPR-style, is more controversial, because the “lacking
histories” can be modeled probabilistically rather than modally, by having
only tiny, or just null, probabilities assigned.
Going Beyond Minkowski. In this paper we have restricted ourselves to
analyzing Past, Present, and Future in a modal framework in which histories
20 For this example I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.
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are isomorphic to Minkowski space-time. One might naturally wonder if this
analysis can carry over to other space-times. The answer is in the affirmative
– as long as the space-times (or rather, histories based on these space-times)
satisfy BST axioms. Although the axioms are not too restrictive, as for
instance they permit many space-times of General Relativity, they imply
asymmetry (i.e., if e < e′, then ¬(e′ < e)), which means that they exclude
space-times with causal loops.
6 What do the past, present, and future look
like?
We will now apply Definitions 5 and 2, and Fact 6 to some selected MBS’s
to visualize what the future, the present and the past of a given event are.
The direction of this little survey is from “nice” to “weird” examples.
Two time-like splitting points. Consider first an MBS with three histories,
i.e. Σ = {σ, η, τ}, in which the proper property attribution yields two
splitting points c1, c2 ∈ <4 such that c2 <M c1 and Sση = {c1} and Sστ =
Sητ = {c2}. That is, η and σ split from τ at c2, and then η splits from τ at c1.
Figure 2 represents these three histories as squares with a common bottom
region. To explain the shadow convention, a difference in shadow indicates
that the corresponding regions are not to be identified (but that does not
imply that every two corresponding points have different properties).
Now pick any event e := [xσ] that is above c2 but not above c1, c2 <M x
and x 6>M c1 and ask: (1) What is the future of e? (2) What is its past? (3)
And what is its present? Fact 6 yields the following verdicts:
1. The future of e = [xσ] is the set of events that are strictly above [c1σ]:
Future([xσ]) = {[zγ] | c1 <M z ∧ γ ∈ {σ, η}}. Note that this region is
the union of two future light cones of c1, in histories labeled by σ and
η. The light cones include boundaries but exclude e. And the future
of e is above c1 rather than above e.
2. The past of e = [xσ] is the set of events that are in history σ and not
strictly above [c2σ]: Past([xσ]) = {[zσ] | c2 6<M z}. In contrast to the
future, the past is shared by all the three histories.
3. The present of e = [xσ] is the set of events in history σ and “between”
c2 and c1 in the sense: Present([xσ]) = {[zσ] | c2 <M z ∧ c1 6<M z}.
The present of e is shared by the two histories to which e belongs.
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Figure 2: The past, the present, and the future of e = [xσ].
Note that the present of e = [xσ] turns out to be a spatially extended and
temporally thick collection of events. Its temporal thickness depends on the
Lorentz interval of the (time-like) vector c1c2. Moreover, in this model co-
presence is transitive as all sets of splitting points contain just one element,
so condition MFB is automatically satisfied.
Four splitting points, layered in two SLR pairs. Consider an MBS
with three histories, i.e., Σ = {σ, η, τ}, with Sση = {c1, c2} and Sστ = Sη,τ =
{c3, c4}, where c3 <M c1 and c4 <M c2 – see Figure 3. Next, pick an arbitrary
event [xσ], with x sliced between two pairs of splitting points, that is, (c3 <M
x or c4 <M x) and (c1 6<M x and c2 6<M x). Applying Fact 6 we get this
result:
Present([xσ]) = {[yσ] | (y >M c3 ∨ y >M c4) ∧ (y 6>M c1 ∧ y 6>M c2)}.
Thus, the present of [xσ] turns out to have the shape of a thick letter W .
Note that by adding more splitting points to Sση and to Sστ we obtain as
Present a “generalized” letter W , with more top corners and more bottom
corners. And by making smaller the separation between Sση and Sστ we can
make the generalized W arbitrarily thin. We can make it extend through the
whole history as well. Yet beware: each construction of this sort requires
EPR-like modal correlations, that is, the satisfaction of condition MFB.
Thus, we may arbitrarily closely approximate the Present as an infinitely
thin maximal space-like hyper-surface, but at the price of a massive EPR-
like modal correlations.
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Figure 3: History {[xσ] | x ∈ <4} with four splitting points c1, . . . , c4. The
present of event e = [xσ] is indicated by the shaded area.
Extreme cases (i) Let us first focus on an MBS with two histories σ and η,
which split at a single point c, so {c} = Sση. For x 6> c (which includes x = c),
Present([xσ]) = {[yσ] | y 6> c} and Future([xσ]) = {[yσ] | y > c}. Note that
Past([xσ]) = ∅. The situation is symmetrical for x > c: Present([xσ]) =
{[yσ] | y > c}, Past([xσ]) = {[yσ] | y 6> c}, and Future([xσ]) = ∅.
(ii) Next consider an MBS with just one history σ. This is a depiction
of global determinism. In this MBS, for every event, its past as well as its
future are empty, from which it follows that for every event, its present is the
entire history. We thus have a block universe, indeed. This is a controversial
verdict as the popular intuition sees a non-trivial past, present, and future
in a deterministic word. For a representative statement of this intuition, see
Gale (1963).
(iii) At the other extreme, if a history splits at every point with some
other history, that is, if ∀x ∈ <4 ∃ η ∈ Σ x ∈ Sση for some σ ∈ Σ, then
every event in history σ has non-trivial past, present, and future. What do
they look like, depends on the details of the model, in particular whether it
satisfies MFB. MFB may be used to construct sets Sση as maximal space-like
surfaces that continuously foliate history σ. Each surface of this kind then
is the Present of every event that belongs to it. If MFB is not satisfied,
the shape of an event’s present depends on the particular way in which the
condition fails. In particular, if all splittings are combinatorial, for each
event e its Past and Present contain all events space-like related to e (so
they overlap), and Present(e) is identical to e itself.
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7 Conclusions
We have investigated a modal explication of the notions of past, present and
future, one constructed on the idea that the past is settled, but the future
is open. In choosing a link between future and contingency, we decided for
a possibly weak association encapsulated by S. We then used a rigorous
framework of BST and MBS to write down our definitions, and prove some
facts about an event’s past, present, and future if the underlying space-time
is Minkowski.
A salient feature of this construction is that the shape of the present
(past and future) of event e from history h depends on the location of the
splitting points of h, understood as chancy events in h. These locations
depend in turn on the localization of qualitative differences between h and
histories alternative to it. The shapes of the present vary wildly, from the
entire history in deterministic models, to a maximal space-like surface of
Minkowskian history in a model with massive EPR-like modal correlations,
or to a single event in models in which there are no such correlations but
every event is chancy. Shapes of the past (the future) vary wildly as well.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of our construction is that the condition
of MFB (which generalizes EPR correlations, by reading them modally) do
useful work. It ensures that co-presence is a transitive relation and that the
present of any event is settled (compare Facts 8 and 10). It can be used
to foliate a history into the succession of presents. Thus, with MFB our
construction may deliver tenses that agree with everyday’s intuitions.
To finish the paper, we would like to take stock of what the proposed
construction achieves. We will therefore go through the list of features
of manifest time given in Section 1, to check which are satisfied in our
construction, and which are not.
To begin with the modal aspect, past, present, and future supervene on
modal notions alone, that is, on relations between sets of histories to which
events belong – see Fact 6. Next, if an event’s past, present, and future
are all non-empty, they provide a tripartite division of each history that
contains the event. But there are models in which an event’s past, or future,
or both are empty, so then the division is less than tripartite. An event’s
future, if non-empty, is open, whereas its past is settled in the sense that
no history contains the whole (non-empty) future, whereas an event’s past
is fully comprised in some history. Further, the present is settled provided
that the model satisfies condition MFB.
There are, however, a few features of manifest time that our construction
may violate. Emphatically, tenses work differently than metric time and
the pre-causal relation that generalizes the ordering defined by light-cones.
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Most conspicuously, special cases aside, an event’s present is not achronal.
That entails that the past, present, and future of our construction fly in
the face of grammatical tenses in English. One may truly say at event e
that e′ will happen, whereas e′ belongs to e’s present. Another flaw is that
generally co-presence is not transitive in models without the MFB condition.
Next, in some models, an event’s past and future overlap. Furthermore, it
is not always true that the presents of different events either agree or do
not overlap. This is because, without the MFB condition, co-present SLR
events may have different futures. This endangers the idea of the flow of
time as the succession of one present following after another. Turning to
the next feature, an event’s present is not always global, since it can be
identical to the event itself, or have a V -shape or a W -shape to be seen
in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively, which can be avoided. However, models
with an event’s present identified with a maximal space-like surface are also
possible, and in Minkowskian history they cannot be avoided by an object
that exists sufficiently long. No matter whether the global character of an
event’s present is satisfied, the present cannot be repeated. Finally, to recall,
modeling the flow of time is outside the scope of this project.
Having seen the pluses and minuses of modally defined past, present, and
future, we leave it to the reader to decide whether these are viable concepts.
We also invite the reader to play with our definitions of past, present, and
future to attempt to deliver a more intuitive, but still modally introduced,
concept of tenses. We nevertheless believe that our definitions achieve a good
balance between, on the one hand, defining tenses in terms of modalities, and
saving intuitions about tenses, on the other.
8 Appendix: Postulates of BST1992
A BST 1992 structure is a pair 〈W,6〉 that fulfills the following conditions:
1. W is a non-empty set of possible point events.
2. 6 is a partial ordering denoting a pre-causal relation on W .
3. The ordering < is dense;
∀x, y ∈ W [x < y ⇒ ∃z ∈ W [x < z < y]].
4. The ordering contains infima for all lower bounded chains: If l ⊆ W is
a chain that has a lower bound (for some e ∈ W , e 6 l), then l has a
unique greatest lower bound inf l:
∀x [x 6 l⇒ x 6 inf l].
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5. The ordering contains history-relative suprema for all upper bounded
chains: If l ⊆ W is a chain with an upper bound (for some e ∈ W ,
l 6 e), and h is a history for which l ⊆ h, then l has a unique smallest
upper bound suph l in h:
∀x [(x ∈ h ∧ l 6 x)⇒ sup
h
l 6 x].
6. Weiner’s postulate: Let l, l′ ⊆ h1 ∩ h2 be upper bounded chains in
histories h1 and h2. Then the order of the suprema in these histories is
the same:
sup
h1
l 6 sup
h1
l′ iff sup
h2
l 6 sup
h2
l′.
7. Prior Choice Principle: If a chain I is lower bounded, and for histories
h1, h2, I ⊆ h1 and I ∩ h2 = ∅, then there is an event c that is maximal
in the intersection h1 ∩ h2 and such that c < I.
A history in 〈W,6〉 is defined as a maximal upward directed subset of
W .21 Prior Choice Principle implies that a typical BST1992 structure is not
locally Euclidean, which might be troublesome. There is an alternative but
computationally more demanding formulation of the Principle, which saves
local Euclidicity by requiring c to be a minimal element in the histories’
difference, h1 \ h2.
21A ⊆ W is called “upward directed” if for any x, y ∈ A there is some z ∈ A such that
x 6 z and y 6 z. Maximal upward directed subsets of W can be proved to exists (by
using the Zorn-Kuratowski lemma).
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